Localising Political Islam For Minority Muslims

Muhammad Haniff Hassan
Introduction
Undoubtedly, Political Islam1 is one of the leading contemporary security issues that political leaders and scholars have to grapple with. In his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel Huntington suggested that future sources of conflict will be found between various civilizations, and that the Islamic civilization is one of the most serious threats and challenges to Western civilization. Islam in Huntington’s perspective encompasses the political dimension. It can be deduced, then, that the Islam which he views as a threat to Western civilization refers to Political Islam; that the political expression of Islam is a threat to the security of Western countries in particular, or to Western modelled countries, which are characterized by secular democracy.2
Other writers have also described Islam as the “green peril”, the “green menace”, the “spectre” and the “enemy” after the fall of communism.3 A study of Muslim terrorist groups’ ideology, Al-Qaeda in particular, will show that the political dimension of Islam is an essential aspect of it. Violence is a tool to achieve political objectives, which are the establishment of the Islamic caliphate or Islamic state, to facilitate the implementation of the syariah law and subjugation of non-Muslims under the rule of Muslims. These necessitate armed rebellion against infidel or apostate governments.4 Political Islam in such a context does create a security threat to governments.
This paper seeks to propose that one of the ways to de-securitise Political Islam in the context of minority Muslims living in non-Muslim countries is by contextualising it to the local realities. This approach does not seek to fundamentally debunk the notion of Political Islam. The basic assumption is that Political Islam is an unavoidable reality for today and the future. It will persist, whether one likes it or not. There will always be a significant segment of the Muslim community who subscribe to the idea. In today’s globalised society, minority Muslims in any many parts of the world cannot be shielded from external influence and the development of Political Islam.
CSRC discussion paper 05/47
September 2005
Disclaimer
The views expressed are those of the Author and not necessarily the official policy or position of the UK Ministry of Defence, the George C Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the United States Department of Defense, the German Ministry of Defence, or the UK, US and German Governments.
Why Focus on Minority Muslims?
This paper focuses on minority Muslims because it is a significant segment of the present Muslim ummah. It is a segment that has not been given due attention, nor distinctly identified, because Islam has closely been associated with its traditional countries in the Middle East, and with the Arabs. Minority Muslims here refers to Muslims who are citizens of non-Muslim countries, or countries which do not belong to the Organisation of Islamic Conference. Minority Muslims are significant because they are estimated to be 30% of Muslim population in the world today.5 Also, the number is expected to grow due to the migration of Muslims and conversion of local Europeans, making Islam a fast-growing religion in the Western world.6
Minority Muslims are also a strategic target for Al-Qaeda propaganda because winning over their support will:
• facilitate Al-Qaeda’s plans to launch operations and bring the battle to non-Muslim countries regarded as hostile, such as America and some European countries
• assist its operation elsewhere by giving access to safe sanctuaries, financing and recruits from the minority Muslim community. The Madrid train bombing7, London bombing8 and the discovery of several plots in Singapore,9 Germany10 and France11 are some examples.
Al-Qaeda seeks to manipulate the identity dilemma faced by minority Muslims; between being Muslim and citizen of the state, and the perceived common discrimination against minority groups.
It is important to see minority Muslims as a distinct segment in counter-ideology work because of the different context that they live in. It will be argued later that this different context and reality offer opportunities to minimize the potential threat, from the Islamic theological and jurisprudence point of view.
Another opportunity also arises from the increased awareness and efforts by minority Muslims in Europe, America and other countries to integrate with the mainstream society in the non-Muslim countries where they live.12 The new generation of Muslim migrants are increasingly making attempts to entrench their roots in the country that they live in and dissociate themselves from the past and historical context of their forefathers.13
Muslim thinkers and religious scholars, increasingly, recognize minority Muslims as a different segment of Muslim ummah in which their different context requires different solutions and approaches for their problems,14 thus, the idea of special fiqh (jurisprudence) for minority Muslims15 and the establishment of European Council for Fatwa and Research.16 By treating Muslim minorities as a different segment of Muslim ummah, more fitting approaches and strategies can be devised. This will increase the effectiveness of counter-ideology work.
Admittedly, minority Muslims are also diverse in many aspects. In Europe and America, minority Muslims consist of various ethnic groups such as Arabs, Turks, South Asian sub-continents and local Caucasians, whereas in places like 2
Singapore, Cambodia and Thailand, Muslims are generally of one ethnic group. But the first important step is to identify that the minority Muslims are a distinct segment of Muslims' ummah as a whole, before attempting to divide them into smaller sub-segments. This segmentation is a corollary to the idea that understanding different contexts in which Muslims live: politically, historically and socially, is essential in counter-terrorism and counter-ideology measures.
The paper attempts to present a view that if minority Muslims can localise or contextualise Political Islam to their reality, or if they can be guided on how Islam allows contextual constraints to moderate their political aspirations, the current perceived security threat could be reduced. This will eventually allow counter-terrorism and counter-ideology to focus on other areas.
Can Political Islam be Localized or Contextualised?
The answer to this question is absolutely yes. Being contextual is one of the fundamental characteristics of Islam. This means Islam takes into account the reality of the time, environment, individual and other factors in determining rules and in practising religion. Hence, the ruling for a certain matter may be different due to differences in reality. This applies whether the rule is a general policy for society, or specific to an individual or a particular group only.17
A good Muslim is not only one who is able to uphold the fundamentals of the religion but also able to contextualise the teachings when the need arises and where necessary. This is based on the following arguments:
1. Islam was revealed gradually to Prophet Muhammad over 23 years.
The main reason behind this incremental approach was to ensure that the revelation catered to the context and the development of the Muslim society then.
A good example would be the implementation of alcohol prohibition in Islam. Consumption of alcohol was a deeply entrenched habit among the pre-Islamic Arabs. It would have been difficult to immediately and totally prohibit them from drinking alcohol.18 Consequently, Islam started by criticising the habit.19 Later on, it prohibited Muslims from consuming alcohol when they wanted to perform prayer.20 Only after 15 years of the revelation, did Islam finally prohibit Muslims from consuming alcohol totally.21
During the first thirteen years after the prophethood of Muhammad, before the migration to Medina, most of the revelation was on matters pertaining to faith and conduct. This was to suit the context of the Muslims who were weak and under persecution in Mecca. Much of the revelation on criminal justice and business transactions started only after the migration to Medina. By then, Muslims had already established their political power, and had the need and the authority to implement those social aspects of justice.
2. Abrogation in Islam.
Islam allows for abrogation. Some of the syariah laws were abrogated due to the changing circumstance of the Muslim society. The prohibition of alcohol is an example – syariah’s earlier stance of mere dissuasion was abrogated in favour of complete prohibition.22
3
3. Practise Islam within one’s own capacity.
The Quran says:
“Allah does not impose upon any soul (a duty) but to the extent of its ability; upon it is (the benefit of) what it has earned, and (the evil of) what it has wrought.” (The Holy Quran, 2:286)
‘To the extent of its ability’ implies that Islam recognizes constraints faced by Muslims in practising the religion. Islam acknowledges that human beings may be inherently limited in their capacity. Thus, Muslims are only obliged to strive the best that they can, and not beyond limits which are against logical and rational constraints. This is the essence of contextualism in Islam.
To demand from Muslims beyond what is realistic and practical, is against the principle of justice, a fundamental attribute of Islam and God Himself.
4. The application of rukhsah in Islamic jurisprudence.
Rukhsah refers to a provision in the syariah, which allows exemptions from a general rule, in the event that the rule involves or causes a debilitating difficulty. The exemption is specific to the need.23
Islam has various check-and-balance systems to ensure convenience in practising it. One of these is rukhsah. The Quran says:
“So, verily, with every difficulty there is relief” (The Holy Quran, 94: 5)
The prohibition against drinking alcohol may be used to illustrate rukhsah. Consider the case of a stranded traveller who has lost his way and cannot find any water to drink except for alcohol. If his situation is so critical that he will die without that drink of alcohol, then alcohol is not prohibited. In fact, the rule of drinking alcohol has then changed from prohibited to compulsory, because Islam does not allow a human being to endanger himself and cause destruction to his body. In Islam, the obligation to preserve one’s life must be prioritised above the prohibition of alcohol. The same goes in a situation where alcohol is used for the treatment of a particular ailment when there is no better alternative to it.
Rukhsah allows the syariah to cater to the varying context faced by man. It provides flexibility for Muslims when they face different situations.
5. Context is always part of the ulama’s consideration in issuing fatwa or religious ruling.
One who studies the opinion of the earlier ulama will find that they changed their fatwa from place to place, time to time, and for one person to another. That is to give due consideration to different situations vis-à-vis space, time and person. Ibn Qayyim wrote:
“The existing laws are of two types. One, which will not change from its original form, whether due to time, place or ijtihad of the ulama; such as the ‘wajib’ [obligatory] ruling on various obligations, the ‘haram’ [prohibited] ruling on various prohibitions, the Hudud 4
[Islamic criminal law] rulings decreed by ‘syara’ [Islam] for various crimes and the like. These are not open to change or ijtihad, which contradict what has been stipulated. The second type are those that may change with the current needs, based on time, place and situation, such as the ruling on ta’zir [punishment other than Hudud and Qisas], its varieties and characteristics.”24
It was reported that during a famine Umar, the second Caliph after Prophet Muhammad, suspended the implementation of the Hudud law, which required that the hands of convicted thieves be cut off. He feared that the offences could have been committed due to hunger caused by the famine. Umar knew that Hudud could not be implemented if there were any doubts, and that particular context had cast serious doubts on the malice behind that act.
In Singapore, the Fatwa Committee of the Islamic Religious Council issued a fatwa disallowing organ transplants in 1973. The fatwa was later changed in 1986 because the advancements in medicine have changed the basis of the fatwa.25
6. Various maxims in Islamic jurisprudence.
The existence of the following maxims in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) is also testimony to the adaptability and flexibility of Islam:26
• Difficulty allows relief
• Harm must be eliminated
• The origin of a ruling on a certain (non-worship) matter is halal unless there are arguments (dalil) on its prohibition
• When any arrangement becomes restricted, it will be made flexible
• A crisis allows the prohibited
• There is no haram (forbidden) if there is crisis, and there is no makruh (permissible but discouraged) if there is necessity
• If you have to choose between two types of harm, the bigger harm should be overcome by choosing the lesser harm
• Hudud may be aborted because of doubt
• The extent of a need is assessed on the crisis, whether it is general or specific
• Prioritise a confirmed benefit above a doubtful one
• Prioritise a bigger benefit above a smaller one
• Prioritise a collective benefit above that for an individual
• Prioritise multiple benefits above single ones
• Prioritise a permanent benefit above a temporary one
• Prioritise the essence of a benefit above its form
• Prioritise a stronger future benefit above a weak current one
• Harm may not be eliminated with a similar harm or a bigger one
• May sustain a lesser harm to avoid a bigger one
• May sustain a specific harm to avoid a general one
• A small harm may be forgiven to achieve a bigger benefit
• A temporary harm may be forgiven to achieve a permanent benefit
• A definite benefit may not be abandoned because of a doubtful harm.
The above maxims demonstrate that Islamic practices are also regulated by a dynamic system of priorities. This is because the shifting elements in any ecology 5
will continually change priorities, subject to the consideration of maslahat (benefit) and mudarat (harm) in Islam.
The ulama’s decision-making frameworks of Maqasid Syar`iah,27 Dharuriyat,28 Hajiyat,29 Tahsiniyat30 and various other concepts illustrate how extensive prioritising is in Islam. The various procedures in fiqh stated earlier signify prioritisation, for instance, prioritising the elimination of a bigger harm than a smaller one, or eliminating a general harm than a specific one.
Finally, Yusuf Al-Qardhawi wrote that among the blessings from God is the existence of some verses in the Holy Quran that are ambiguous, and hence allow for various interpretations and understanding. These give a wide opportunity to anyone who needs to make various considerations, or choose an opinion that he feels is closer to the truth and the objectives of the syariah.
Certain opinions may be suitable at a certain time but inappropriate at another, suitable in a particular environment but not in another, suitable in a certain situation but not in another. Different views (ijtihad) have their own foundation and arguments, and each has its truth. With various views of the ulama available, Muslims may choose one, which is, in their opinion, of stronger and more immediate benefit according to their social situation and time. Any expert on fiqh will vouch that this is legitimate, as there is consensus that one cannot dispute a mujtahid (expert on Islamic laws) in matters of ijtihad.31
The above suffices to highlight that being contextual is a fundamental characteristic of Islam. But like any other religion, Islam possesses fundamentals that are absolute and unchangeable. What remains in contention are:
􀂃 what are the absolutes that may not be changed,
􀂃 in the event that absolutes are not feasible, exactly when may rukhsah be applied, and
􀂃 how contextualisation is to be carried out.
Basic Concept Underlying Political Islam
The concept underlying Political Islam is the belief that Islam is a way of life. It is a comprehensive religion governing all aspects of human life, with no separation between any of the aspects.32 This concept is based on the following:
1. The Quran says,
“And I have only created Jinns and men that they may serve Me.” (The Holy Quran, 51:56)
This verse stresses that mankind was created with the objective of worshipping Allah.
2. The Quran also says,
“And, behold your Lord said to the Angels: I will create a vicegerent on earth.” (The Holy Quran, 2:30)
6
This verse explains that Man was made a khalifah (vicegerent) of this world and hence, carrying out this role constitutes an act of worship to Allah. It must, however, be done based on Islam as Allah Almighty says,
“Indeed, the religion before Allah is Islam.” (The Holy Quran, 3:19)
“If anyone desires a religion other than Islam never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost (all spiritual good).” (The Holy Quran, 3:85)
Thus, to the proponents of Political Islam (the Islamists)33 once a Muslim understands that the very purpose of life on this earth is to worship God and that it must be done according to the teachings of Islam, he will understand that Islam permeates all aspects of human life.34 This characteristic of Islam is known as syumul (comprehensive).
Yusuf Al-Qardhawi wrote:
“Indeed, syumul permeates time in totality, life in totality, and all aspects of human life in its entirety… it is a thesis for all time and generations, and not just for a certain period or era… it is a thesis that speaks to all humanity, all nations, all races, and all social classes. Indeed, Islam is a thesis for all mankind. It is also a thesis for every level of human of life and its existence... It is a thesis for mankind in every aspect of life. ”35
The concept of syumul in Islam has been summarised by Hasan Al-Banna in the first of his 20 Usul (Principles), as follows:
“Islam is a comprehensive system which deals with all spheres of life. It is country and homeland, or government and nation. It is conduct and power, or mercy and justice. It is a culture and a law, or knowledge and jurisprudence. It is income and wealth, or gain and prosperity. It is jihad and propagation, or army and cause. And finally, it is true belief and correct worship.”36
This pervasiveness of syumul may be seen from the variety of books on fiqh and etiquette in Islam. These books discuss diverse topics in life from hygiene, to the relationship between husband and wife, affairs of the state, matters of justice and social regulations. Consequently, Islamists say Islam does not accept detaching any aspect of life from the guidance of religion. Allah says,
“O you who believe! Enter into Islam completely.” (The Holy Quran, 2:208)
In the Holy Quran, Allah condemned the people of the past who believed in part of His teachings and rejected the rest:
“Then is it only a part of the Book that you believe in, and do you reject the rest? But what is the reward for those among you who behave like this but disgrace in this life? – and on the Day of Judgement they shall be consigned to the most grievous penalty. For Allah is not unmindful of what you do.” (The Holy Quran, 2:85)
7
The Islamists view that since it is a way of life, Islam certainly includes politics because politics is part of the reality of life. It is the responsibility of every Muslim to implement Islam in politics or to participate in politics in accordance with the principles of Islam. Hence, a Muslim cannot separate Islam from politics or politics from Islam.37 Besides the inherent implications of syumul itself, there are other arguments that Islam includes political aspects. Among them are:
a. God created man to be the khalifah (caliph/vicegerent) on earth. The word khalifah itself means power and leadership, as the Quran says;
“Allah has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will, of a surety, grant them in the land, inheritance (of power), as he granted it to those before them; He will establish in authority their religion – the one which He has chosen for them; and that He will change (their state), after the fear in which they (live) to one of security and peace: ‘They will worship Me (alone) and not associate aught with Me.’ If any do reject the Faith after this, they are rebellious and wicked”. (The Holy Quran, 24:55)
b. God made some of his prophets kings and leaders, for example the Prophets Daud (David) and Sulaiman (Solomon). Even Muhammad was not only a prophet, but also the political leader of Medina.
c. The teachings of Islam cannot be implemented in perfection without political power to implement its criminal laws and justice.
Hasan Al-Banna said:
“We are calling out to you, our people, with the Qur'an in our right hand and the Sunnah in our left, and the deeds of the pious ancestors as our example. We invite you to the teachings of Islam, the laws of Islam and the guidance of Islam. If, in your eyes, this seems ‘political’, then so be it; but it is our ‘policy’. And if the one who summons you to these principles is considered a ‘politician’, then we are the most honourable of men, and praise be to Allah, in ‘politics’! And if you wish to call this ‘politics’, say what you like, for names will never harm us and our goals stand unveiled.”38
Ultimately, Islamists argue that Islam, as a way of life, differs from secularism. The difference is one of principle. Secularism segregates the role of religion from matters of society and state, limiting it only to the personal sphere and to places of worship. In contrast, Islam has guidelines for all aspects of life and demands its believers’ commitment to all its teachings. Therefore, whatever the form of secularism, whether it be one which totally rejects the role of religion in society, or one which limits it to just the moral aspects of society, or one with the purpose of eliminating religion from society, or one which accepts religion to secure harmonious living, it is, in principle, conflicting with the concept of religion in Islam.
Unlike the European experience, secularism was never a critical success factor for the Muslim ummah.39
Factors to Consider for Contextualisation
8
Political Islam has to operate within its own ecology. Ecology refers to the environment as it relates to living organisms.
In principle, religious scholars are in consensus that fatwa and ijtihad should apply according to the reality and context in question, so long as they are consistent with the principles and methodologies that are recognised by the scholars.
For Political Islam to operate in the appropriate ecology requires an appreciation and understanding of the ecology in which Muslims exist. This, in turn, requires an understanding and appreciation of the roles of the elements and organisms within that ecology. Muslims also need to distinguish the more significant elements and their roles, whose oversight may eliminate maslahat and produce mudarat.
Once Muslims are familiar with all the important elements, it is time to measure them against the standards of Islam with regard to the principles and the siyasah syar’iyah.40 These principles serve to guide the ummah in their practice of Islam, with clear awareness of the elements within their own environment or the ecology as a whole.
For example, if Muslims were to regard the minority position of Muslims as an important element of the ecology, they should place it against the standards of Islam and produce principles of operationalising Islam relevant for the minority position of Muslims in their country.
But what are the elements that shape the ecology of Islam in a particular country? This is a question that requires in-depth study and research, which is beyond the capacity of this writing. However, the following list of important factors for minority Muslims consideration in Singapore can be an example for other minority Muslims in other countries:
1. There are about 400,000 Muslims in Singapore representing 15% of the population. Nevertheless, Muslims form the largest minority group here.
2. Muslims in Singapore are predominantly Malays. This is unlike the Muslim minority groups in America or Europe, which are less homogenous. In these countries, the Muslim population consists of people from different cultures and countries of origin.
3. The dominant group is Chinese, who are mainly Buddhists.
4. The government practises democracy that in general provides the citizens with a fair amount of freedom. While there have been criticisms of Singapore's democratic system and the existing government, Muslims can safely say that the government do not practise the dictatorship style of government typical of former Yugoslavia. Neither are the Muslims here persecuted for their religion or race, unlike the Muslims’ plight in Chechnya.
5. In practising secularism, the government ensures a non-partisan approach when it comes to religious matters. This is to ensure religious harmony. While Islam is critical against secularism as a philosophy, Muslims should distinguish the secular practices in Singapore from those practised by Kamal Ataturk, which privileged secularism to the extent of desecrating symbols of Islam.
6. Singapore has a society that is cosmopolitan, open and urban by nature. These characteristics have been fortified by the effects of globalisation. As a result, Singaporeans are affected by events happening around the world and not just influenced by internal factors or their immediate environment. Globalisation
9
offers Muslims in Singapore a wealth of resources and opportunities, as well as unbridled access to information and misinformation.
7. Although Muslims in Singapore are still lagging behind economically, they have the benefit of living in an advanced developing economy and financial centre.
8. Singaporeans are generally affluent with a relatively high gross income.
9. Muslims in Singapore are surrounded by other Muslim groups that together, form a majority in this region. For example their neighbour, Indonesia, has the largest Muslim population in the world.
10.Muslims in the region have been experiencing a revival – a return to the fundamentals of Islam.
Contextualising Islamists’ View Towards Secularism41
While secularism refers to the segregation of the role of religion from the affairs of society and the state, within secularism itself there are various models and schools of thought. Hence, there are varied opinions on the exact nature of the relationship between secularism and religion. These range from moderate to extreme; depending on the extent they allow religion to play a role in the life of man. Briefly, the two distinct schools of thought are:
a. The school of thought which limits the role of religion to within the individual and personal spheres of life, and to places of worship, without being against it, and even recognises the role of religion in building character in man.
b. The school of thought which altogether denies any role for religion, is against all basic religious concepts such as the existence of God, the Hereafter, Heaven and Hell, and which strives to separate or eliminate religion from man’s life.
Understanding that there are various schools of thought within secularism, and analysing each one independently, is important in deriving the appropriate judgement and treatment for any one of them. S Abid Hussein wrote:
“There is serious misunderstanding among our people, especially among Muslims, as to what is secular thought or secularism. They presume that this philosophy (secularism) absolutely rejects religion as a necessity in life. However, secularism need not oppose or marginalise religion. Many people who honestly believe in the academic and political aspects of secularism, do respect religion as something noble… Nevertheless, in the end, in the Christian countries, they (the clergymen) finally accept a Secular State on the grounds that such a State recognises religious values as the basis of its struggle, even though the State is not founded on religious belief - at the very least, it is based on the principles of reasoning and the experience of religion.”42
Such an understanding will allow Muslims to determine the maslahat (benefit) and mudarat (detriment) of a particular school of thought more accurately.
Being practical and contextual in nature, Islam drives Muslims to recognise the following realities:
a. In many parts of non-Muslim countries, the Muslim community enjoys reasonable freedom in practising their religion.
10
b. While Muslims believe in the comprehensiveness of Islam, the socio-political realities of minority Muslims indicate that the possibility of practising the comprehensive Islam in non-Muslim countries is remote. Due to this, minority Muslims need to choose more appropriate and beneficial priorities.
c. Not all secularism practised by governments is in the form of anti-religion. Some governments adopt secularism as a non-partisan (neutral) policy that the government does not take the side of any religion in order to ensure inter-racial harmony.
The existence of a Muslim community under the rule of a non-Muslim government, or a government that is not fully Islamic in nature, is not new. There are at least three precedents:
a. Some of the companions of the Prophet lived in Ethiopia under the patronage of a non-Muslim authority, with Prophet Muhammad’s blessing. In the beginning, their stay there was to seek asylum from the persecution they faced in Mecca. However, they continued to stay there for 6 years after Prophet Muhammad established the Islamic state of Medina.43
b. Najasyi (Negus) remained as the King of non-Muslim Abyssinia (Ethiopia), although he had embraced Islam.44 Ibn Taimiyah wrote:
“And Najasyi (Negus), he certainly could not have judged with the laws as contained in the Quran. Indeed his people did not allow him to. Many Muslim individuals were elected as judges among the Mongols and even as leaders, for whom there were matters of justice that they wished to implement but were not able to do. In fact, they were prohibited from doing so. And Allah does not burden one unless it is within his capabilities. Therefore, Najasyi and the likes of him are people who are happy in heaven, although they did not commit to the syariah of Islam to the extent they were not capable of, because they ruled with what they were capable of.”45
c. Prophet Yusuf (Joseph) served as a minister under a non-Muslim king.46
These precedents exemplify the realities of Muslim life in an environment where Islam cannot be practised in total. They also demonstrate that Muslims facing non-ideal situations are granted rukhsah (exemptions). In these precedents, the Muslims contributed their best efforts to safeguard the common good, that is, to ensure justice and freedom. Furthermore, the Quran and the Sunnah (Prophet Muhammad’s traditions) did not comment negatively on any of these three incidents.
Although Muslims are obliged to live Islam comprehensively, as argued by the Islamists, their inability to do so does not mean that their faith or status in God’s eye will be lower than that of other Muslims because they are obligated to strive only within the constraints imposed upon them. Minority Muslims today face common reality of living under the rule of non-Muslims and secular government.
Secularism adopted by governments takes many forms. In many countries, like Singapore for example, secularism is not the secularism which is anti-religion. Rather, it is similar to that which took shape in the other countries of Western Europe like the United Kingdom and the United States of America. It allows freedom for Muslims similar to that for believers of other religions. They have the right to believe, practise, teach and propagate their religion (Islam).
11
The Indian secular constitution includes several values central to Islam, such as spiritual freedom, freedom of thought, and the universal spirit of brotherhood which does not discriminate race and colour, upholds justice in the legal, social and economic aspects as basic rights, and makes all these as the most important objectives to be achieved by India. It also allows the Muslim citizens of India the opportunity to propose changes to anything in the national constitution or the norms of the nation itself, which in their eyes, may seem to be against the values of Islam, and to ask for other Islamic values to be acknowledged and ratified.47
Dr. Azzam Tamimi also wrote:
“Today it is estimated that about one third of the Muslims in the world are minorities in the countries they live in. Under normal circumstances, where the majority of the population in a given country are Muslims, it is the duty of Muslims to endeavor to establish Islam in their lives at the individual and collective levels, at society and state levels. However as the minority, the best option for the Muslim community, in the opinion of leading Islamic scholars of today, would be to work towards the establishment of a secular democratic government that will respect human rights and guarantee security and freedom of expression and belief. In this case, Muslims serve their interests by being party to consolidating the civil society which they live in. Doing so would be the best guarantee for their freedom of worship and freedom of choice… One of the great accomplishments of secularism is the space it provides for pluralism and a reasonable degree of coexistence. Muslims should recognise that the presence of millions of them in majority non-Muslim societies today for the first time in such big numbers, is the fruit of several factors including the secularist revolution, which liberated the state from the hegemony of the church. In fact, until an Islamic shura (consensual) system of government is established, the second best alternative for Muslims is a secular democratic. Under such a system of governance, it is agreed to respect the fundamental rights of all people without discrimination, without commitment to religious frames of reference. What matters in such a system is that despotism is checked.”48
Based on the above, while the Islamists argue that secularism does not fundamentally conform to Islamic teaching, such a stand need not necessarily produce hostility and confrontation against a secular state. Muslims can co-exist and accept this situation, so long as the freedom of religion is guaranteed, in line with country’s constitution and international conventions without jeopardising their principles.
Contextualising The Aspiration for an Islamic State49
Muslims must acknowledge the context of minority Muslims and their reality. Appreciating such context does not go against the principle of Islam, in fact it is part of Islamic teachings. Hence, the aspiration for an Islamic state should be considered in that light.
12
Muslims should understand that politics is but one of the various facets of Islam that need to be presented and established. In a situation where Muslims have so much to say about Islam, but are limited by resources, it is important that they stress the right priorities in presenting Islam to the public. Even if a Muslim agrees with the Islamists that rejecting or denouncing the notion of Islamic state as an integral part of Islam is against the teaching of Islam, nevertheless, speaking of an Islamic state and setting the objective of establishing it a non-Muslim countries where Muslims are minorities do not serve the priorities either. Pursuing such an agenda does not augur well with the characteristic of Islam as a practical and realistic religion for all mankind.
In the context of minority Muslims, the priority is to safeguard the free and peaceful environment, which allows them to practise the basic obligations of the religion in the spirit of democracy, and to promote a civil society.
The inability to establish an Islamic state here, or to live under its rule, does not mean that minority Muslims will be inferior to that of other Muslims. This is because it is only obligatory for Muslims to work within existing constraints. The Quran says:
“On no soul does Allah place a burden greater than it can bear.” (The Holy Quran 2: 286)
The story of Najasyi (Negus) provides good lesson for minority Muslims. Although Najasyi was a Muslim, he could not come out openly as a Muslim, nor could he implement the laws of Islam because of opposition from his people. Yet, upon Najasyi’s death, Prophet Muhammad described him as a pious man and a brother to the believers. He had remained in Abyssinia as king to protect the Companions who migrated there, and to uphold the level of justice that he was able to. The Prophet commanded that prayers be carried out for Najasyi. If he was not considered a Muslim, Prophet Muhammad could not have commanded that prayer, as it is a last rite of honour specifically for Muslims.50 Prophet Muhammad’s statement and action demonstrate tacit endorsement for Najasyi (Negus)’s actions.
Coming to Terms with Living In a Non-Islamic Country51
Accepting the reality and embracing the above contextual position requires minority Muslims to come to terms with living in a non-Islamic country and environment. With a proper knowledge of Islam, coming to terms with the issue should not be a problem at all. Many of Prophet Muhammad’s companions traveled far away from the Muslim community and lived with other communities to spread the message of Islam. This was how Islam eventually spread all over the world. The arrival of Islam in the Malay Archipelago and China were clear examples. Without living with other communities, Islam could not have spread peacefully in China, southeast Asia and many other parts of the world. Thus, it is illogical to view that living in a non-Islamic environment is fundamentally unIslamic and wrong.
Admittedly there are ulama who rule that living in a non-Islamic country is not permissible but most of them are from the Maliki school of jurisprudence. Hanafi, Syafi`ii and Hanbali schools of jurisprudence allow residing in a non-Islamic country. However, their ruling is conditional on the extent that the religion, as well as the self-worth and property of Muslims, may be placed in jeopardy by so doing.
13
If a Muslim is weak, such that he is not able to practise his religion and is afraid his religion may be jeopardised in a non-Muslim country, then it is haram (forbidden) for him to reside there, regardless of whether he had moved from a Muslim country to a non-Muslim country, or if he embraced Islam in a non-Muslim country. It is obligatory upon him to migrate. If he is unable to do so immediately, then it is not obligatory till all obstacles to migrate are gone. If a Muslim is able to practise his religion and is safe in a non-Muslim country, then it is mubah (permissible) for him to stay.52 Their stand is based on the verse in the Quran:
“When angels take the souls of those who die in sin against their souls, they say: ‘In what (plight) were ye?’ They reply: Weak and oppressed were we on earth.’ They say: ‘Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to move yourselves away (from evil)?’ Such men will find their abode in Hell - what an evil refuge! Except those who are (really) weak and oppressed – men, women and children – who have no means in their power, nor (a guide-post) to their way. For these, there is hope that Allah will forgive: for Allah does blot out (sins) and Allah is Oft Pardoning, Oft Forgiving. He who forsakes his home in the cause of Allah, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious ...”(The Holy Quran 4: 97-100)
A close study of the verses will show that these they cannot be used as the indisputable argument for forbidding residence in a non-Islamic country because it is possible to interpret it the other way, to allow living there. The ulama who allow Muslims to live in non-Islamic countries view that hijrah (migration) is obligatory only for those who are not able to practise their religion.53 Therefore one who is able to practise his religion may remain in a non-Islamic country.
The view was supported by the practice of the Prophet Muhammad. He allowed several of those who embraced Islam later to remain in Mecca and not migrate to Medina. It was related that a companion of the Prophet by the name of Abu Nu`aim embraced Islam. When he wanted to migrate, his tribe appealed to him not to, as he contributed towards caring for the orphans and widows of his tribe. In return, his tribe promised to defend him should others threaten him. He postponed his migration. After he finally moved to Medina, Prophet Muhammad responded to his story, “My people chased me out and wanted to kill me, whilst your people protect and defend you. ”54
This hadith (Prophet’s saying) demonstrates that if one is not afraid his religion will be jeopardised, then he is allowed to stay with his people who are non-Muslims. Najasyi stayed with his people in Abyssinia as a Muslim ruler living among non-Muslims. So it was with the companions of the Prophet who sought protection there. They only came back to be with the Prophet six years after the Islamic state of Medina was established.55
A Companion by the name of Fudaik said to Prophet Muhammad: “Indeed, many people allege that anyone who does not migrate will be destroyed.” Prophet Muhammad said, “O Fudaik! Establish prayers, pay zakat, avoid evil doing, and stay wherever you like with your people.” Fudaik said, “I assume that Prophet Muhammad also said ‘(Then) you are as those who migrated.'” (Related by Ibn Hibban and Al-Baihaqi)
Prophet Muhammad said:
14
“If you meet your enemies among the unbelievers, call them to three things; whichever one they choose, accept from them, and restrain yourself. Invite them to move from their place to the place of the Muhajirin (those who have migrated). Tell them that if they do so, for them the rights of the Muhajirin, and on them, the responsibilities of the Muhajirin. If they refuse and choose their place of abode, tell them they are the same as the Bedouin Arabs among the Muslims. The laws of Allah are just as applicable to them, but not for them the booty of war.” (Related by Muslim)
This illustrates that for those who embrace Islam in a non-Islamic country, it is only recommended for them to migrate to a Muslim country. If they do not do it, there is nothing wrong with that.
This group of ulama views that the hadith (the Prophet’s saying) which connote prohibition do not indicate absolute prohibition. If it was absolute, it will contradict with the above hadith.
Sheikh Jadal Haq, Sheikh Al-Azhar, issued a decree (fatwa):
“If a Muslim feels that his religion is safe and he is able to practise it freely in a country with no religion or in a non-Muslim country, it is allowable for him to stay. If he fears for his religion, morals, property or self-worth, then it is obligatory for him to move to a country where he can be safe.”56
Based on the above and the reality of minority Muslims in a non-Muslim democratic countries, Muslims should not take living in their country negatively. The fact is, there is no country whether Muslim or otherwise, perfectly fulfilling all the conditions that will allow Muslims to practise their religion in total. Wherever a Muslim goes today, he will face a situation that demands his striving to help achieve an ideal Muslim community.
All these strengthen the argument that staying put in a non-Muslim country is not disgraceful to Muslims. It does not make one a Muslim of lower status compared to those who live in Islamic countries.
In fact, there are more opportunities to share the message of Islam in such a country. This gives more opportunities to earn rewards from God, as mentioned in the hadith:
“By Allah, if Allah guides someone through your efforts that is better for you than a red camel.” (Related by Al-Bukhari)
“Anyone who starts a good practice, then for him the reward for that effort, and also the reward for the person that learns from him.” (Related by Muslim)
If Islam allows Muslims to remain in a non-Muslim country and if they choose to live there, it is then important for them to build their outlook and basis of thinking on the commitment to stay there. They should then participate constructively in developing the country, without neglecting the responsibility to offer constructive advice and criticism, consistent with the practice of democracy, justice and Islam 15
itself. Islam should not become a factor that imposes psychological or other difficulties on Muslims in coexisting with non-Muslims or in non-Islamic country.
Concluding Remarks
What has been said should not be assumed to be an effort to silence Muslims’ voice and stiffen their activism. By appreciating realities, Muslims do not necessarily become passive in the society or apprehensive in engaging in matters pertaining to politics.
Good Muslims, Islamists or not, should not condone evil doing in society. But based on the above arguments, two main important points need to be noted.
First, even in the worldview of the Islamists, the Islamic state is but one of many obligations to be fulfilled by Muslims, Thus, based on the realities, instead of pursuing the aspiration for the establishment of an Islamic state, Muslims should engage the political domain of the society on issues of justice, corruption, rule of law, respect for human rights, civil liberties, cultural, social and economic development, which are important in Islam too. These are the practical and relevant issues in the context of minority Muslims. They are also amongst the priorities of Islam and represent common goals with any politically inclined citizens.
There are also many social issues that cry out for the attention of concerned minority Muslims in their country. Politics is not the only area that Muslims need be concerned with, or channel their activism to. The comprehensiveness of Islam as viewed by the Islamists themselves comprises social and political aspects of life. It is not too far-fetched to assume that in the context of non-Muslim democratic countries, social activism should generally be given priority over political activism. There is nothing stopping minority Muslims in their country from campaigning against gambling, casual sex, alcohol addiction, drug consumption and prostitution, for example as long it is done in accordance with the law.
The second point concerns the approach to achieving change. In the effort to change the realities which do not fit with Islamic principle and teachings, Muslims should take up a more universal approach and position. Efforts for change need not necessarily be presented in religious language and not merely on the basis of the authority of religion or tradition, but on the basis of rational observation and argument.57
There is another dimension to ensure the success of contextualising Political Islam in Singapore. Rachid Ghannochi wrote
“The real problem lies in convincing the 'other', that is the ruling regimes, of the principle of 'the people's sovereignty' and of the right of Islamists -- just like other political groups -- to form political parties, engage in political activities and compete for power or share in power through democratic means.”58
If the political elites harbour the idea that Political Islam is inherently a security threat to the country and hence should not be allowed to manifest itself in the society in any form, or that Islam and politics should never be mixed, then they themselves are actually living in a non-realistic view. 59
16
Political Islam is not a monolithic phenomenon. Not all Islamists seek to establish an Islamic state, and not all of them seek to establish it by revolutionary or military means.60 Ibrahim A. Karawan wrote:
“It is important at the outset to make two sets of distinctions. The first distinction is between Islamic groups (which focus on individual redemption and social reform) and Islamist groups (which focus on gaining state power). The second distinction is between political Islamist groups (who use peaceful means to obtain power) and militant Islamist groups or MIGs (who strive to seize state power through violent means).”61
Political Islam is a reality of today but will be a growing trend in the future of southeast Asia. Thus, it will affect minority Muslims, however one attempts to prevent it. Opening up space for the emergence of a contextual or moderate strand of Political Islam should be considered as an option to prevent all Islamists from being pulled to the extremists’ camp.
It is understandable if non-Muslims do not agree with the worldview of the Islamists and the notion of the Islamic state. The question is: does this disagreement necessarily cause conflict or disharmony or threaten one’s survival?
Even without Political Islam, differences between Muslims and non-Muslims remain. Political differences exist in real life, not within the purview of Political Islam. In many countries, democrats and socialists-communists compete with each other for political power without necessarily causing security threats. Admittedly, Political Islam may be a problem for political practitioners, but a political problem should not be treated as a security problem.
Islamists who are committed to peaceful political and democratic process must be viewed in the context of the pluralistic nature of a society and political players, the civil society and basic rights. Examples of such Islamists are the Refah Party in Turkey62, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Properous Justice Party) in Indonesia and PAS in Malaysia. In spite of various labels thrown on them such as fundamentalists, the ups and downs of their political endeavour and often being oppressed by the ruling regimes, they remain committed to the democratic and peaceful process.
The political elites must also realise that encroachment of religion into politics is not necessarily due to the emergence of Political Islam, instead, it may also be caused by the encroachment of politics on the religious domain. Since the emergence of secularism, the line that separates religion and politics has always been ambiguous.63
Furthermore, in today’s context, the state has tremendous power to interfere in what is traditionally the personal and private domain of its citizens, to the extent that the institutions enabling the cultivation of religious virtue become subsumed within (and transformed by) legal and administrative structures linked to the state. Thus, the (traditional) project of promoting and preserving religion will necessarily be “political” if it is to succeed.64 An example is the establishment of Islamic Religious Council by the Singapore government under whose supervision religious institutions such as mosques and madrasahs (religious schools) fall. In implementing Compulsory Education (CE) policy in Singapore, the government agreed to accept Singaporean Muslims’ demand that Muslim children enrolled in
17
local full time madrasahs be exempted on condition that the total annual enrolment to the madrasahs is capped at 400 children only. For madrasahs to qualify as designated schools, which allow them to continue admitting children exempted from CE at primary 1, they have to meet certain benchmarks related to the Primary School Leaving Examination held by Singapore Ministry of Education.65 This, thus, requires madrasahs to revamp their original curriculum so as to implement the national primary school curriculum for English, Mathematics and Science subjects.66
While contextualising Political Islam is important, such efforts must also be supported by a positive attitude from the political elites to allow for fruitful dialogue, constructive engagement and civil space. James Turner Johnson was quoted:
“Islamic normative thinking does not separate the religious from the political and is derived from the Koran. This is a fundamental difficulty between the West and the world of conservative Islam. Johnson says: 'We can’t understand how they can have a society where religion and politics mix and they can’t understand why we don’t. And we fault each other for these characteristics.'”67
In conclusion, theologically, contextualising Political Islam is possible. However, its success will depend on the attitude and mindset of minority Muslims and the political elite. It is also important to mention again here that if the true grievances of minority Muslims, such as discrimination against them based on their ethnicity and religion, are not addressed, the effort to contextualise Political Islam in the mind of minority Muslims will not achieve the intended result.
Endnotes
1 Political Islam here refers to the idea that Islam and politics are two inseparable parts (din wa daulah) and the establishment of Islamic state for full implementation of syariah is an obligation to Muslims wherever they live. Its proponent is known as Islamist. See Richard C. Martin (ed.), Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, Thomson-Gale, New York, 2004, vol. 2, 536-40; John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 151; M. A. Faksh, Islamic Fundamentalist Thought: An Analysis of Major Theoretical Formulations, in Islam: Critical Concepts in Sociology edited by Bryan S. Turner, Routledge, London, 2003, vol. IV, pp. 167-71; Lawrence Davidson, Islamic Fundamentalism: An Introduction, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 2003, pp. 12-7.
2 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1997, p. 45-8, 102, 109-11, 184. See also Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, in Policy, Summer 2001-2002, pp.17-26, available at http://www.cis.org.au/Policy/summer01-02/polsumm01-3.pdf (27 July 2005).
3 See Leon T. Hadar, “The “Green Peril”: Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist Threat”, in Policy Analysis No. 177, 27 August 1992, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-177.html (27 July 2005); uskael Sezgin, “Does Islam pose a threat to the West?”, in Perceptions Journal of International Affairs, vol. 5, no. 2, June-August, 2000, p. 63; Esther Webman, “The Undimished Threat of Political Islam”, available at http://www.dayan.org/islam2000.pdf (27 July 2005); Martin Bright, “Terror, Security and the Media”, in Guardian Unlimited, 21 July 2002, available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/libertywatch/story/0,1373,758265,00.html (27 July 2005); John Esposito, “Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace”, in Current History, January 1994, available at http://www2.iiu.edu.my/deed/articles/espo.html (28 July 2005); Richard Sokolsky and Tanya Charlick-Paley, Nato and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far,
18
RAND, 1990, p. 51, available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1074/mr1074.chap5.pdf (27 July 2005); Steve Niva, “Between Clash and Cooptation: US Foreign Policy and the Specter of Islam, in Middle East Report, no. 208, US Foreign Policy in the Middle east: Critical Assessments, Autumn, 1998, pp. 26-9.
4Bin Laden’s Fatwa, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places”, in Online NewsHour, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html (27 July 2005); “World Islamic Front for Jihad Againts Jews and Crusaders: Initial “Fatwa” Statement, in Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 23 February 1998, available at http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/fatw2.htm (27 July 2005).
5 M. Ali Kettani, Muslim Minorities in the World Today, Mansell Publishing, London, 1986, pp. 238-41.
6 “Fast-growing Islam winning converts in Western world”, in CNN, 14 April 1997, available at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/14/egypt.islam/ (27 July 2005); Barr Seitz, “Fastest Growing Religion Often Misunderstood”, in BICNews, 13 December 1997, available at http://www.iol.ie/~afifi/BICNews/Islam/islam21.htm (27 July 2005); M.M. Ali, “Muslims in America: The Nation’s Fastest Growing Religion, in Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May/June 1996, available at http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0596/9605013.htm (27 July 2005); Craig S. Smith, “Where the Moors Held Sway, Allah is Praised Again”, in the New York Times, 21 October 2003, available at http://www.geocities.com/WestHollywood/Park/6443/Fastest/moors.html (27 July 2005); “Muslims in Western Europe”, in the Economist, 8 August 2002, available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1270416#abroad_at_home,_by_satellite (27 July 2005); Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, “Do Muslims Not Belong to This Christian Europe?”, in the Independent, 16 December 2002; Uwe Siemon-Netto, “Faith: Islam’s Third Run For Europe”, in UPI, 12 November 2002, available at http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20021210-101508-1152r (27 July 2005).
7 “In Depth Madrid Train Attack”, in BBC News, 27 August 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/europe/2004/madrid_train_attacks/default.stm (27 July 2005).
8 London Terror, in CNN.com Specials, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2005/london.bombing (27 July 2005).
9 White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrest and the Threat of Terrorism, Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003, pp.10-4, available at http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/detailed.jsp?artid=667&type=4&root=0&parent=0&cat=0&mode=arc (27 July 2005).
10 “Germany remands terror suspects”, in BBC News, 25 April 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1951699.stm (27 July 2005).
11 “Paris ‘terror plot’ probe: 4 held”, in CNN.com, 17 December 2002, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/12/17/paris.arrests/ (27 July 2005).
12 Pergas, Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore, Singapore, 2004; Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Muslim…Moderate…Singaporean, Alkhair Mosque Management Board and Perdaus, Singapore, 2003.
13 See Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, The Islamic Foundation, United Kingdom, 2002; M.A Muqtedar Khan, American Muslims: Bridging Faith and Freedom, Amana Publication, Maryland, 2002; Mohamed Siddique Seddon, Dilwar Hussein and Nadeem Malik, British Muslims: Between Assimilation and Segregation: Historical, Legal and Social Realities, Islamic Foundation, United Kingdom, 2004; Mohamed Siddique Seddon, Dilwar Hussein and Nadeem Malik, British Muslims: Loyalty and Belonging, Islamic Foundation, United Kingdom, 2003.
14 See M. Ali Kettani, Muslim Minorities in the World Today, Mansell Publishing, London, 1986.
15 See Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, Fi Fiqh Al-Aqalliyat Al-Muslimah: Hayat Al-Muslimin Wast Al-Mujtamaat Al-Ukhra, Dar Asy-Syuruq, 2001; Muhammad Sulaiman Tubuliyak, Al-Ahkam As-Siyasiyah Li Al-Aqalliyat Al-Muslimah Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, Dar An-Nafais, Lebanon, 1997.
16 See European Council for Fatwa and Research official website available at http://www.e-cfr.org/eng/ (27 July 2005)
19
17 See Wahbah Az-Zuhaili, Usul Fiqh Al-Islami, Dar Al-Fikr, Damsyik, 1986, vol.2, p. 1116. See also Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, Al-Khasais Al-`Ammah Li Al-Islam, Maktabah Wahbah, Cairo, 1977, pp. 233 – 7.
18 Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, Al-Khasais Al-`Ammah Li Al-Islam, pp.170-3.
19 See The Holy Quran, 16:68 and 2:219
20 Ibid, 4:43
21 Ibid, 5:90
22 Wahbah Az-Zuhaili, Usul Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, vol. 2, pp. 936-7.
23 Asy-Syatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, Dar Al-Fikr, place not cited, date not cited, vol.1, p. 210
24 Ibn Qayyim Al-Jauzi, Ighatsah Al-Lahfan Fi Ma`abid Asy-Syaitan, Al-Maktab Al-Islami, Beirut, 1987, vol.1, p. 488.
25 See the fatwa at www.muis.gov.sg/rservices/oom_files/1.doc (27 July 2005)
26 Each of these procedures requires detailed explanations as to its basis, application and exceptions. As it is not the objective of this paper to discuss the procedures, the explanations are not included here. It is important not to use the procedures literally. Detailed explanations on these procedures may be found in these references:
• Jalaluddin As-Suyuti, Al-Asybah Wa An-Nazair, Dar Al-Kutub Al-`Ilmiah, Beirut, 1979.
• Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, Fi Fiqh Awlawiyat Dirasah Jadidah Fi Dhau’ Al-Quran Wa As-Sunnah, Maktabah Wahbah, Kaherah, 1995, pp. 28 – 30.
• Mukhtar Yahya & Fatchurrahman, Dasar-dasar Pembinaan Hukum Fiqh Islam, PT Al-Maarif, Bandung, 1993.
27 This means the general objectives of the syariah, which are to:
• Safeguard religion
• Safeguard life
• Safeguard the mind
• Safeguard progeny
• Safeguard property
See Asy-Syatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, vol. 2, pp. 2-4.
28 It refers something that is required as a necessity to safeguard the maslahat (needs) of religion and the world, its absence will cause damage and destruction to life. See Asy-Syatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, vol. 2, p. 4.
29 It refers to something that is required as a convenience in life, its absence will cause hardship, but not destruction. See Asy-Syatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, vol. 2, pp. 4-5.
30 It means something that is good or complementary to have, but its absence will not cause hardship or destruction. See Asy-Syatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, vol. 2, p. 5.
31 Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, Al-Khasais Al-`Ammah Li Al-Islam, p. 231–2.
32 Sayyid Qutb, Milestone, available at http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/milestones/hold/chapter_3.asp (28 July 2005). See also Abu Al-`Aala Al-Maududi, Islamic Way of Life, available at http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/islamic_way_of_life/index.htm#b2 (27 July 2005).
33 The Islamist here means any person who subscribes to the idea that Islam and politic are two inseparable parts and the establishment of Islamic state is an obligation to Muslims wherever they live in.
34 Sayyid Qutb, Milestone, available at http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/milestones/hold/chapter_5.asp (28 July 2005).
35 Yusuf Al-Qardhawi, Al-Khasais Al-`Ammah Li Al-Islam, pp. 99-105.
36 Hasan Al-Banna, The Message of the Teachings, available at http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/tmott/index.htm#understanding (27 July 2005)
37 Abu Al-`Aala Al-Maududi, Islamic Way of Life, available at http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/islamic_way_of_life/index.htm#b14 (27 July 2005).
20
38 Hasan Al-Banna, To What Do We Invite Humanity?, available at http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/to_what_do_we_invite_humanity/index.htm#foreword (27 July 2005)
39 Dr Azzam Tamimi, Islam & Secular Society, available at http://www.ii-pt.com/web/papers/society.htm (27 July 2005). See also Can Islam Be Secularised, available at http://www.ii-pt.com/web/papers/secularism.htm (27 July 2005)
40 Siyasah Syar’iyah means Islamic Public Administration Policy
41 Adaptation from Seminar Paper 1 presented in Convention of Ulama organised by PERGAS on 13 – 14 September 2003 written by the writer of this paper. The paper was translated to English and published in Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore, Pergas, Singapore, 2004, pp. 108-15.
42 S. Abid Hussein, The Destiny of Indian Muslims, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1965, pp. 170-5, 195-202. See also Sean L. Yom, Islam and Globalization: Secularism, Religion and Radicalism, available at http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/IPG/IPG4_2002/ARTYOM.HTM (27 July 2005)
43 Ibn Katsir, Al-Bidayah Wa An-Nihayah, Maktabah Al-Ma`arif, Beirut, 1984, vol. 3, p. 205.
44 Imam Al-Bukhari related that Prophet Muhammad commented of Najasyi’ (Negus)s death, “Today died a pious man.” This hadith (the Prophet’s saying) is proof that Najasyi (Negus) had embraced Islam, otherwise Prophet Muhammad would not have done the solat ghaib (last prayers in absence) for him. It is also an argument (dalil) for Muslims to live among non-Muslims, if they are not afraid for their religion. See Ibn Katsir, Al-Bidayah Wa An-Nihayah, Maktabah Al-Ma`arif, Beirut, 1984, vol. 3, p. 77. See Sulaiman Muhammad Tubuliyak, Al-Ahkam As-Siyasiyah Li Al-Aqalliyat Al-Muslimah Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, Dar An-Nafais, Lebanon, 1997, p. 51.
45 Ibn Taimiyah, Majmu’ Al-Fatawa, Matabi’ Ar-Riyadh, Riyadh, 1372H, vol. 19, p. 218-219.
46 See the Holy Quran, 12: 55-56.
47 S. Abid Hussein, Kaum Muslimin Di Negara Sekuler India, in ed. John Donahue and John Esposito, Islam & Pembaharuan Ensiklopedia Masalah-masalah (transl. Islam in Transition, Muslim Perspectives), C.V Rajawali, Jakarta, 1984, p. 304.
48 Dr. Azzam Tamimi, Islam & Secular Society; available at http://www.ii-pt.com/web/papers/society.htm (27 July 2005)
49 Adaptation from Seminar Paper 1 presented in Convention of Ulama organised by PERGAS on 13 – 14 September 2003 written by the writer of this article. The paper was translated to English and published in Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore, pp. 117-27.
50 See Ibn Katsir, Al-Bidayah Wa An-Nihayah, vol. 3, p. 77. See Sulaiman Muhammad Tubuliyak, Al-Ahkam As-Siyasiyah Li Al-Aqalliyat Al-Muslimah Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, Dar An-Nafais, Lebanon, 1997, p. 51.
51 See Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim Community in Singapore, pp. 224-36.
52 Cited by Muhammad Sulaiman Tubuliyak, Al-Ahkam As-Siyasiyah Li Al-Aqalliyat Al-Muslimah Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, p. 49. See Al-Jassas, Ahkam Al-Quran, Dar Al-Kutub Al-`Ilmiah, Beirut, 1994, vol. 2, p. 305. See Al-Kuhji, Zad Al-Muhtaj Syarh Al-Minhaj, Idarah Ihya’ At-Turats Al-`Arabi, Qatr, 1987, vol. 4, p. 329. See Ibn Taimiyah, Majmu’ Al-Fatawa, vol. 28, p. 240. See An-Nawawi, Raudhah At-Talibin, Al-Maktab Al-Islami, Beirut, 1985, vol. 10, p. 282. See Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1992, vol. 10, p. 505.
53 Ibn Katsir, Tafsir Al-Quran Al-Azim, Dar Ihya’ Al-Kutub Al-Arabiyah, Cairo, vol. 1, p. 542. See also Al-Baidhawi, Tafsir Al-Baidhawi, Istanbul, 1988, vol. 2, p. 163.
54 See Ibn Sa`ad, At-Tabaqat Al-Kubra, Dar Sadir, Beirut, 1985, vol. 4, p. 138. See Ibn Al-Atsir, Usud Al-Ghabah Fi Ma`rifah As-Sahabah, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1989, vol.4, p. 570. See Ibn Hajar, Al-Isabah Fi Tamyiz As-Sahabah, Dar Al-Kutub Al-`Arabi, Beirut, vol. 3, p. 537.
55 Ibn Katsir, Al-Bidayah Wa An-Nihayah, vol 4, p. 205.
56 Cited by Muhammad Sulaiman Tubuliyak, Al-Ahkam As-Siyasiyah Li Al-Aqalliyat Al-Muslimah Fi Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, p. 54. See Majallah Al-Azhar, vol 6, 63rd year, Jumada Al-Akhirah 1411H, December-January 1991, p. 618.
57 S. Abid Hussein, “Kaum Muslimin Di Negara Sekuler India”, in Islam & Pembaharuan, Ensiklopedia Masalah-masalah (transl. Islam in Transition, Muslim Perspectives), edited by 21
John Donahue and John Esposito, p. 304; Khurram Murad, Da’wah Among Non-Muslims in the West, available at http://www.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/dawah_among_non_muslims_in_the_west/p4.htm (27 July 2005).
58 Rachid Ghannouchi, “The Participation of Islamists in a Non-Islamic Government”, in Power Sharing Islam, edited by Azzam Tamimi, London, Liberty for Muslim World Publication, 1993, p. 63.
59 Sean L. Yom, Islam and Globalization: Secularism, Religion and Radicalism, available at http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/IPG/IPG4_2002/ARTYOM.HTM (27 July 2005)
60 Sana Abed-Kotob, “The Accomoditionists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt”, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Aug., 1995), pp. 321-39. See “The Preface”, in Montasser Zayyat,The Road to Al-Qaeda, Pluto Press, London, 2004, pp. xii-xvi. See also Cheryl Benard, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources and Strategies, RAND Corporation, 2003, pp. 1-14. See also See G.H Jansen, Militant Islam, Pan Books Limited, London, 1979.
61 Ibrahim A. Karawan, Violence As A Strategic Choice: The Case Of Militant Islamist Groups, p. 1, available at http://www.oquirrhinstitute.org/gs_karawan.html (27 July 2005). See also Hilal Khashan, “The New World Order and the Tempo of Militant Islam”, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1. (May, 1997), pp. 12-4.
62 See M. Hakan Yavuz, “Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey”, in Comparative Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1. (Oct., 1997), pp. 63-82.
63 Sean L. Yom, Islam and Globalization: Secularism, Religion and Radicalism, available at http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/IPG/IPG4_2002/ARTYOM.HTM (18 Oct. 2004)
64 Charles Hirschkind, “What is Political Islam?”, in Middle East Report, no 205, Middle East Studies Network: The Politics of a Field (Oct .- Dec.), 1997, pp. 12-4.
65 Singapore Ministry of Education, Compulsory Education, available at http://www.moe.gov.sg/ce/exempt.htm (27 July 2005).
66 See also Singapore Ministry of Education press release on 15 August 2000. Available at http://www.moe.gov.sg/press/2000/pr15082000.htm (27 July 2005).
67 Jane Lampman, “Morality and War”, in Christian Science Monitor, vol. 93, issue 222, 11 October 2001, p. 14. She was citing James Turner Johnson, professor of religion at Rutgers University.
22